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Abstract—The growth in the number of Android and Internet
of Things (IoT) devices has witnessed a parallel increase in
the number of malicious software (malware), calling for new
analysis approaches. We represent binaries using their graph
properties of the Control Flow Graph (CFG) structure and
conduct an in-depth analysis of malicious graphs extracted from
the Android and IoT malware to understand their differences.
Using 2,874 and 2,891 malware binaries corresponding to IoT
and Android samples, we analyze both general characteristics
and graph algorithmic properties. Using the CFG as an abstract
structure, we then emphasize various interesting findings, such
as the prevalence of unreachable code in Android malware,
noted by the multiple components in their CFGs, and larger
number of nodes in the Android malware, compared to the
IoT malware, highlighting a higher order of complexity. We
implement a Machine Learning based classifiers to detect IoT
malware from benign ones, and achieved an accuracy of 97.9%
using Random Forests (RF).
Index Terms—Malware; Android; IoT; Graph Analysis; IoT
Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background. As IoT finds new applications, IoT software
security becomes of a paramount importance. IoT malware
stands as one of the most significant threats to the security
and stability of the Internet, and understanding IoT malware
through analysis and detection is an essential problem to
mitigate their security threats [1], [2]. The limited existing
literature on IoT malware, and despite malware analysis,
classification, and detection being a focal point of analysts
and researchers [3]–[5], points at the difficulty, compared to
other malware types. To understand IoT malware, we perform
software analysis between IoT and Android samples, using
graph properties obtained from CFG structures, and build a
detection system of IoT malware utilizing those properties.
Overview. Starting with a new dataset of IoT malware sam-
ples, we pursue a graph-theoretic approach to malware anal-
ysis. Each malware sample can be abstracted into a Control
Flow Graph (CFG) to extract representative static features of
the application. As such, graph-related features from the CFG
can be used as a representation of the software, and classi-
fication techniques can be built to tell whether the software
is malicious or benign. Using the CFG graph constructs, We
perform a comparative study of those graph-theoretic features
in both types of software to highlight the CFG shift in IoT
malware to Android application malware to uncover various
similarities and differences. We similarly analyze the CFGs of
261 IoT benign samples and use that to build IoT classifiers
from 23 different features extracted from the CFGs.
II. DATASET
Our IoT malware set is 2,874 samples, randomly selected
from IoTPOT [6]. We also obtained a dataset of 2,891 Android
malware samples from [7] for contrast. Finally, we manually
created a dataset of benign samples from source files gathered
from OpenWrt.org [8], and kernel files. To this end, we
disassembled the IoT binaries, in the form of Executable
and Linkable Format (ELF) files, as well as the Android
Application Packages (APKs) using Radare2 [9] to extract
the CFG from the disassembly codes. Moreover, we used an
off-the-shelf tool, NetworkX [10], for further graph analysis.
III. EVALUATION METRICS AND RESULTS
Evaluation Metrics. For our initial analysis of the various
malware (Android and IoT) and benign samples, we use
various standard algorithmic graph properties, including the
number of nodes, the number of edges, the closeness, the
number of components, etc. For the lack of space, we omit the
definitions of those properties, and refer the interested reader
to [5] for more details. In the following, we use a normalized
version, from 0 to 1, of the closeness centrality.
A. Analysis
Android malware size differs from IoT malware signifi-
cantly. Upon analyzing CFG of different samples belonging
to each class, we observed that the Android and IoT malware
samples have at least 28,691 and 367 nodes, and 33,887 and
577 edges, respectively. Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent the
logarithmic scale for the number of nodes and edges, where
the dynamic region of the CDF in Figure 1 is between 1 and
60 nodes, while the active region in Figure 2 between around
1 to 85 edges correspond to around [0.2–0.3] (about 10% of
samples). This combined finding of the number of edges and
nodes in itself is very intriguing: while the number of nodes in
IoT malware samples is relatively smaller than that in Android
malware, the number of edges is higher. This is striking, as
it highlights a simplicity at the code base (smaller number
of functions) yet a higher complexity at the flow-level (more
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Fig. 1: Log scale for nodes
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Fig. 4: Number of compo-
nents: IoT vs. Android.
edges; calls between functions), adding a unique analysis angle
to the malware that is only visible through CFG structure.
IoT CFG’s are not only dense, but also well enmeshed
graphs. Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the CDF for the average
closeness centrality and number of components, respectively,
for both datasets. To reach this plot, we notice that around 5%
of the IoT and Android have around 0.14 average closeness
centrality. On the other hand, The same 80% of IoT samples
have a closeness of less than 0.19, highlighting that the close-
ness alone with the value 0.2 can be used as a distinguishing
feature of the two different types of the malware. The relatively
higher value also highlight that IoT graphs are well enmeshed.
CFG analysis shed light on software anomalies. 3.23% of
the IoT malware (93 IoT samples) have more than two compo-
nents; i.e., most have one component that have file sizes from
56,500 – 266,200 bytes. On the other hand, 13.83%, or 400
Android samples, have only one component, where their size
ranges from around 4,200 – 9,400,000 bytes. However, 2,491
samples (around 86.17%) have more than one component,
which show that the Android malware often uses unreachable
functions. We observe multiple components in Android CFG,
which show the presence of multiple entry-points in the same
program. These point the use of decoy functions with the aim
to circumvent an analyst when trying to analyze the malware.
The gap between datasets can be noticed, showing the new
shift trend of the Android malware to the IoT devices.
B. Classification
As a result of the differences between IoT and Android
malware across those graph features, it’s natural to utilize those
features of classification. To this end, we build a classifier
for detecting IoT malware against bengin IoT samples. Upon
extracting 23 different features from the CFGs for all samples
(based on the betweenness centrality, closeness centrality,
degree centrality, shortest path, density, # of edges, and # of
nodes). Upon initial analysis, we obtained 2,347 IoT samples
for classification against 261 benign samples. The results are
TABLE I: Classification results for the whole dataset, biased
towards malicious samples. All results are percentages. False
Negative Rate (FNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Discov-
ery Rate (FDR), False Omission Rate (FOR), F1 score (F1),
and Accuracy Rate (AR).
Method Actual FNR FPR FDR FOR F1 AR
LR 16.6 6.7 28.5 4.0 36.3 2.9 67.0 93.89.5 228.0
SVM 22.3 6.1 20.7 1.6 14.5 2.6 81.8 96.23.8 228.6
RF 23.6 3.1 11.6 1.1 9.6 1.3 89.5 97.92.5 231.6
CNN 22.9 3.0 1.3 11.5 1.4 1.4 98.7 97.63.2 231.7
reported in Table I using standard binary classification perfor-
mance metrics. The results are obtained using 10-fold cross-
validation. As shown, we obtained an accuracy of 97.87%
using Random Forest classifier.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We conduct an in-depth graph-based analysis of three dif-
ferent datasets to highlight the similarity and differences of
IoT and Android malware, as well as benign IoT software
towards detection of new IoT malware. Toward this goal, we
extract the CFGs as an abstract representation to characterize
IoT malware across different graph features, and highlight the
shift in the graph representation from the IoT to the Android
malware by tracing size (nodes, edges, and components). We
observe decoy functions for circumvention, which correspond
to multiple components in the CFG. Using those features, we
built a classifier that achieved 97.9% of accuracy with 1.1%
FPR and 11.6% FNR in IoT malware detection.
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